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Women as Supreme Court
Advocates, 1879-1979

MARY L. CLARK*

I. Introduction
As 2004 marks the 12 5th anniversary of women's admission to the Supreme Court bar, this is
a fitting occasion to reflect on women's experiences and achievements before the Court. Given
that this is a history piece, this paper will focus principally on the first 100 years of women's
advocacy before the Court, from 1879 to 1979.1 In this 100-year period, women's membership
in the Supreme Court bar grew from two or one or no women per year between 1879 and 1900
(at a time when men were joining at the rate of 250 to 350 per year) 2 to over 5 percent of
new admittees by 1979. Today, women constitute 25 percent of the roughly 4,500 to 5,000 new
admittees each year,3 but only 8 percent of the bar overall.

What you find in broad brushstroke in
studying the history of women's advocacy before the Court is that, in the first several
decades, women advocates were drawn principally from solo and small practices-typical
of most attorneys of their day-and were not
litigating women's rights claims before the
Court. In the first half of the twentieth century, women advocates were drawn principally
from government agencies at the local, state,
and national levels, and, again, with few exceptions, were not litigating women's rights claims
before the Court. In the 1960s and 1970s, a

growing number of women advocates were affiliated with civil-rights advocacy groups, explicitly involved in litigating sex- and racediscrimination cases before the Court. Finally,
in the last twenty-five years, women advocates
before the Court have been affiliated in roughly
equal measure with government agencies, nonprofit advocacy groups, and law-school faculties. Women presenting argument as members ofthe leading law firms remain extremely
rare. 4

After highlighting some of the most notable women advocates of the last century, I
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belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life.
Ultimately, he concluded:
The paramount destiny and mission
of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator.7

Myra Bradwell was a successful Chicago entrepreneur
who made a fortune publishing legal texts. Trained as
a lawyer, she was refused admittance to the Illinois
bar because of her sex. The Supreme Court upheld
the state bar's refusal in 1873, but women were able
to join most state bars by the end of the century.

conclude with thoughts on why it matters that
women have appeared, and continue to appear,
before the Court.

II. Women's Initial Entry Into
the Legal Profession
Women first entered the legal profession in the
United States immediately following the conclusion of the Civil War. Their numbers grew
modestly but steadily through the turn of the
century, despite the Supreme Court's 1873 decision in Bradwell v. Illinois,6 which rejected
Myra Bradwell's claim that Illinois had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
and Immunities Clause when it refused her
admission to its bar on the grounds of sex.
In concurring in the judgment in Bradwell,
Justice Bradley now famously (or infamously)
declared:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which

Even with the holding and rhetoric of Bradwell, women succeeded injoining most states'
bars in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
such that by 1900, there were one thousand
women lawyers in the United States.
An increasing number of law schools began to admit women at this time,8 with women
seeking-and gaining-access on the grounds
that they were equal in their abilities to men and
should therefore learn the law alongside men.
By contrast, women gained admission to medical schools on the ground that women's inherently nurturing natures suited them especially
well for the care of women and children, with
many aspiring doctors attending all-women's
medical schools.9 Largely because of the different ideologies shaping women's entry into
the two professions, there were seven times as
many women doctors as lawyers at the start of
the twentieth century. 10
III. Women First Admitted
to the Supreme Court Bar
Belva Lockwood (1830-1917) had been a
member of the District of Columbia bar for
three years when she first applied for membership in the Supreme Court bar in 1876. At that
time, as now, an applicant for the Court's bar
was required to "demonstrate a minimum of
three years' membership in good standing in
the bar of her state's highest court, and to have
her application sponsored by a current member of the Supreme Court bar. If her application was approved, admission [was] ... moved
and granted in open court. It was not until the
1970s that applications for admission to the
Supreme Court bar [could be] processed by
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been largely published over the country much to the detriment of her law
practice upon which your petitioner
and her family are dependant [sic] for
support.
Wherefore your petitioner prays
your Honorable Body for the passage
of an Act enabling her or any other
woman similarly situated to be admitted to the said ... Court on the same
terms as men ..13

Belva Lockwood lobbied Congress hard to petition for
women to be admitted to the Supreme Court bar.
Part of her strategy included addressing Senators
she didn't know "as though they were old familiar
friends."

mail." 1 Once admitted, attorneys could file
briefs and present argument, but most, then as
now, joined the bar principally for its symbolic
value.
Chief Justice Morrison Waite authored the
order denying Lockwood's application, which
declared:
By the uniform practice of the court,
from its organization to the present
time ... none but men are admitted
to practise [sic] before it as attorneys and counsellors. This is in accordance with immemorial usage in
England, and the law and practice in
all the States until within a recent
period ... . 12
Not easily defeated, Lockwood lobbied
Congress to amend the Court's bar admission rules to include women. Her petition to
Congress read as follows:
[Y]our petitioner has been debarred
from admission ... on the ground that
she is a woman, and that fact has

Lockwood proved to be a tenacious lobbyist.
"Nothing was too daring for me to attempt,"
she later confessed. Among other things, she
addressed senators she didn't know "as though
they were old familiar friends." 14
After three years of Lockwood's lobbying,
Congress enacted an "Act to Relieve Certain
Legal Disabilities of Women," providing for
women's membership in the Supreme Court
bar.15 Successfully reapplying for admission
in 1879, Lockwood became the first woman
to join the Court's bar. Albert Riddle, a white
professor at Howard Law School, moved her
application. 16 A year later, Lockwood moved
the admission of Samuel Lowery of Huntsville,
Alabama, the first Southern black to be admitted to the Court's bar.17
Once the Court's doors were pried open,
women began to sponsor one another's membership in the bar as a type of old-girls' network. The movants included the Pier family of
lawyers-a mother and three daughters-who
were without peer in sponsoring one another's
Supreme Court barmembership inthe 1890s.18
"These [earliest women] members were well
known to one another. They worked together
in the woman suffrage movement ... and corresponded with one another about personal and
professional issues." 19 Addressing one another
as "Sisters in Law," they grappled with issues
of what to call themselves-"Lady Lawyers"
or just plain "Lawyers," of how to manage
competing demands of work and family, and
even of what to wear as professional women.
Whether to wear one's hat in court was an issue of no small concern for the earliest women
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A year after she herself was permitted to become a member of the Supreme Court bar in 1879, Lockwood
(left) moved the admission of Samuel Lowry of Huntsville, Alabama. Lowry (second from left) became the first
Southern black admitted to the Supreme Court bar.

lawyers. A well-dressed, modest woman ofthat
day wore a hat whenever in public. At the same
time, a lawyer was expected to take his hat off
in court. Demands of modesty prevailed over
those of professional custom, and women's
hats remained on in court.
Despite what I would now call a widely
held "feminist consciousness" among these
first women (though the term "feminist" was
first used only decades later), 20 only one of
the first women Supreme Court bar members litigated a women's rights claim before
the Court. 21 This again was Lockwood, who

brought an original action in the Court on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated
women who were denied membership in the
Virginia state bar on the ground of sex.
By contrast, the handful of earliest women
members who actually appeared before the
Court did so in disputes concerning wills,
property, and contracts, typical of the solo or

small law offices in which they practiced. And,
given men's greater participation in business
and property holding at this time, it is not surprising to learn that these women advocates
represented male clients more often than they

did female.
IV. Belva Lockwood, the First
Woman to Argue Before the Court
Belva Lockwood was the first woman to argue before the Supreme Court, 22 doing so in
1880, the year following her admission to the
bar. There, in the case of Kaiser v. Stickney, 23
Lockwood sought to use married women's
legally disadvantaged status to benefit her
clients, a married couple who sought to disavow the wife's transfer of property to a third
party.24 Though Lockwood opposed restrictions on married women's property rights as
a matter of principle, she nevertheless invoked
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traditional understandings of the limited nature
of married women's dominion over property in
pressing her clients' case. The Court rejected
Lockwood's argument on factual grounds,
finding that the property transfer was valid because it had been executed by both husband
and wife. 25
After running for President on the Equal
Rights party ticket in the 1880s, Lockwood
petitioned the Supreme Court in 1894 to direct the state of Virginia to admit her to its
bar, from which she had been excluded on the
basis of sex. In relying on Bradwell to reject
Lockwood's petition, the Court concluded
that Virginia had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause by interpreting the word "persons"
to mean "male," and not "male andfemale persons," in defining who was eligible for its bar.26
Lockwood's next, last, and most famous argument was on behalf of the Eastern
Cherokee Indian Nation, heard for two days in
1906.27 There, "the Supreme Court affirmed [a
lower court] judgment, awarding over a million
dollars with interest against the United States"
as reparations for its forced relocation of the
Cherokees. 28

V. Highlights of Some of the Most
Notable Women to Appear Before
the Court in the Century
Following Lockwood
In the first decades of the twentieth century,
when there was one woman attorney for every
5,000 to 10,000 lawyers in the United States,
a couple of dozen women filed certiorari petitions and/or merits briefs in the Supreme
Court, mostly appearing on behalf of local,
state, or federal governments. As with the earliest women advocates, essentially no one in
this second wave litigated cases directly framing women's rights issues before the Court. 29
Annette Abbott Adams (1877-1956)
Annette Abbott Adams graduated from Boalt
Hall Law School in 1912, the only woman in

s1

her class. Thereafter, Adams trained with a
voice instructor to lower her voice in order
to promote her career prospects.3 0 In 1914,
she appeared at trial against John Preston,
the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of
California. Adams is said to have so impressed
Preston that he hired her as one of his assistant
U.S. attorneys, making her the first woman to
serve in that position. When Preston was called
to Washington to serve as assistant attorney
general in 1918, Adams was named to fill his
vacancy as U.S. attorney, the first woman to
hold that post and the only one to do so until
the Carter administration.
In 1920, Adams herself was called to
Washington to serve as an assistant attorney
general, where her primary responsibility was
enforcing Prohibition. She was again the first
woman to hold this office. Adams was named
to this post shortly after the 1919 ratification
of the Eighteenth Amendment, 31 prohibiting
commerce in liquor, and the 1920 ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment, guaranteeing
women the right to vote. Some ascribe the
President's choice of Adams to an effort to
"woo" the new women voters (and thus an early
manifestation of concern for the gender gap in
voting). 32
Though she was in office for slightly under a year, Adams argued five Supreme Court
cases, losing only one. Three of the cases involved Prohibition, one railroad safety, and
the other tax forfeitures. In each case, Adams
was the only woman to appear on brief or at
argument. 33

Mabel Walker Willebrandt

(1889-1963)
Earning the moniker "Prohibition Portia,"
Mabel Walker Willebrandt oversaw the federal government's enforcement of Prohibition,
along with tax and insurance-law matters, as
Adams' successor between 1921 and 1929. In
interviewing Willebrandt for this post, President Warren Harding noted that the only thing
against her was her age (32), a condition,
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As an assistant attorney general in the 1920s, Mabel Willebrandt gained national fame for vigorously enforcing
the Prohibition Act. She argued frequently before the Supreme Court but struggled during oral arguments to
understand the Justices, as she was losing her hearing.

Willebrandt assured him, that would go away
with time. 34

Willebrandt participated in more than 270
cases at the certiorari stage 35 and twenty-two
cases at the merits stage during her eight years
with the Justice Department, presenting oral
argument in at least ten cases, including four
that were argued in the same month.36 In each
case, Willebrandt was the only woman to appear on brief or at argument.
The vast majority of cases in which
Willebrandt participated related to Prohibition.
While Willebrandt, like Adams, had not been
a prohibitionist before coming to Washington,
she "was determined to uphold the law" 37 once
in office. Among her Supreme Court cases was
one defending against a challenge to the Prohibition Act as unconstitutionally discriminating
between malt liquor and "spiritous and vinuous liquors" by allowing doctors to continue
prescribing wine and spirits for medicinal pur-

poses, but not beer.38 The Court ruled with the
government in that case.
The Associated Press called Willebrandt
"the most famous woman attorney during the
first halfofthe twentieth century." 39 One ofher
biographers went even further, calling Willebrandt the most famous American woman of
her time. 40 In eulogizing her, Willebrandt's
friend and former law partner, Judge John
Sirica, declared, "'If Mabel had worn trousers,
she could have been President."' 4 1
Nevertheless, Willebrandt's time in office
was a difficult one, for, among other things,
she was losing her hearing. 42 In writing to her
mother the night before arguing a case in the
1923 Term, Willebrandt confessed, "Each time
it's such a struggle not to be terrified over my
ears. [The Justices] talk so low." 43
Though Willebrandt actively campaigned
for Hoover in 1928, she was forced out of office following his 1929 inauguration-some
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Susan Brandeis (right) is
the only daughter of a sitting Justice to have argued
before the Court. Justice
Brandeis recused himself
from argument and decision in the 1925 case
and urged his daughter
to "raise [her] professional
performance as high as
[her] abilities and hard
work would make possible."

say because she was too outspoken a figure in enforcing Prohibition.t Willebrandt's
hoped-for federal judgeship, as reward for her
government service, was dashed on the same
shores. 45

Susan Brandeis (1893-1975)
To date, the only daughter of a sitting Justice to argue before the Court46 is Susan
Brandeis, daughter of Associate Justice Louis
Brandeis.47 Justice Brandeis recused himself
from argument and decision in the 1925 case of
Margolin v. United States,48 involving a challenge to a federal statute prohibiting attorneys
from charging more than $3 for work in preparing a veteran's benefits claim.

The novelty of Brandeis' argument won
front-page attention in the New York Times,
which announced, "Brandeis's Daughter in
Supreme Court Today to Argue New York
War Insurance Fee Case." 49 As Frank Gilbert,
son of Susan Brandeis, recounts, after the
argument:
Grandfather [Justice Brandeis] wrote
mother [Advocate Brandeis] who was
then thirty-two:
"You are certainly getting fine publicity and fruits will come later if you
will raise your professional performance as high as your abilities and
hard work would make possible.
50
Lovingly, Father."
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A unanimous Court rejected Brandeis' argument and upheld the attorney-fee limitation.

1940s and 1950s
As with many fields of endeavor, women's opportunities in the legal profession expanded
during World War II, only to contract with
men's return from war and the postwar emphasis on stability, security, and domesticity. It was
during the war, for example, that the first female Supreme Court law clerk, Lucille Lomen,
was hired, by Justice William 0. Douglas in
1944. It would be another twenty-two years before the next woman law clerk was hired," and
another fifteen or so years beyond that before
there was anything resembling a critical mass
of women serving as Supreme Court clerks.
How the service of women law clerks affected
the Justices' receptivity to women advocates
can only be guessed,52 and becomes a factor
only at the very tail end of the period under
consideration here, if at all.53
Despite women's service on many fronts
during the war, the Court upheld a state law
prohibiting women from serving as bartenders
shortly after the war's conclusion. This was
the case of Goesaert v. Cleary,54 in which
a woman, Anne Davidow, argued on behalf
of the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court. In
its opinion rejecting the women's claims, the
Court made light of the idea of women tending
bar, replete with references to Shakespeare's
alewife.
Women pursuing legal careers in the postwar era spoke of being out of step with the
dominant cultural expectations of the timefor women to marry young, bear children, and
stay home. Indeed, as late as 1961, the Supreme
Court relied on an understanding of women as
the "center of home and family life" to uphold
a Florida law excluding women from service as
jurors unless they specially registered their interest in advance. 56 Gwendolyn Hoyt, who had
been convicted ofmurdering her husband by an
all-male jury, argued on appeal to the Court that
a jury that included some women might have

responded more sympathetically to her evidence of ongoing abuse by her husband. Hoyt
was briefed by two women-Raya Dreben for
petitioner and Dorothy Kenyon for the ACLU
as amicus in support of petitioner 51-but
argued by men.
In spite of a postwar environment that discouraged the interests and ambitions of professional women, a small number were active in
the Supreme Court at this time, two of whom
are highlighted below.

Bessie Margolin (1909-1996). As an attorney with the Labor Department in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s, Bessie Margolin "rose to become assistant solicitor in charge of Supreme
Court litigation" and associate solicitor for Fair
Labor Standards.5 8 Margolin participated in
dozens of Supreme Court cases while at the
Labor Department,'5 9 where she was the expert on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
the federal law regulating wages and hours of
work,60 and most of her Court arguments involved interpreting the FLSA.61
Unlike Adams and Willebrandt, who were
the only women on either side of their cases,
Margolin was accompanied on brief by other
women attorneys with the Labor Department.62 As with Adams and Willebrandt, however, Margolin's cases by and large did not
present women's rights issues. In reflecting
on Margolin's ability as an advocate, Justice
William 0. Douglas observed, "She was crisp
in her speech and penetrating in her analyses,
reducing complex factual situations to simple,
63
orderly problems."

Beatrice Rosenberg (1908-1989). Appearing
at approximately the same time as Margolin,
Beatrice Rosenberg is said to hold the women's
record for presenting argument in the Courtthirty cases in as many years.64 By contrast, the
record for men in the twentieth century "belongs to Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence
Wallace, who has argued more than 150 cases"
65
in the Supreme Court.
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A career attorney with the Justice Department's Criminal Division between 1943 and
1972, Rosenberg rose through the ranks to the
position of chief of criminal appeals, where
she was recognized for her expertise on searchand-seizure law.66 Among the cases Rosenberg
participated in before the Court were Abbott
Labs v. Gardner,67 holding pre-enforcement
review of regulations issued by the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare not prohibited by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act;
and Welsh v. United States,68 reversing Welsh's
conviction for draft evasion on the grounds that
his nontheistic conscientious objection was
held with "the strength of more traditional religious convictions."
One colleague described Rosenberg's oral
advocacy style as spellbinding, "[She] was a
very powerful woman ... I was awe-struck by
[her]." 69 Justice Douglas, in The Court Years,
included Rosenberg on a short list of Justice
Department attorneys who, in his estimation,
"made more enduring contributions to the art
of advocacy before us than most of the 'big70
name' lawyers."
Women Appointed to Represent Pro Se Parties in the Supreme Court. During the period
in which Margolin and Rosenberg were appearing regularly, the Court appointed its first
woman to represent the interests of a pro se
party before it.7 1 This was Helen Washington,
a tax attorney at the Justice Department, who
was appointed in 1959.72 Dean Acheson, considered to be the first man to serve in this capacity, had been named more than twenty-five
years earlier.73
1960s and 1970s
Two of the most prominent Supreme Court advocates of all time appeared on behalf of civil
rights advocacy groups in the 1960s and 1970s:
Constance Baker Motley, of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund (LDF);
and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, of the

ss

American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU)
Women's Rights Project.
Constance Baker Motley (1921-present).
Constance Baker Motley argued ten racediscrimination cases before the Court in the
early 1960s, winning nine of them. 74 The one
case she lost was subsequently overturned.
This was the case of Swain v. Alabama,7 5 upholding the use of race-based peremptory challenges injury selection, which the Court would
later reject in Batson v. Kentucky. 76
Having joined the Inc. Fund immediately after graduating from Columbia Law
School, in 1946, Motley participated in the
Supreme Court briefing of all of the major race-discrimination cases of her time.7 7
When Thurgood Marshall left the Inc. Fund
for a federal appellate judgeship in 196 1,78
Motley and colleague Jack Greenberg took
over the LDF's Supreme Court arguments.7 9
The cases in which Motley argued fell into
three broad categories: sit-ins, criminal procedure, and desegregation of public services.8 0
Motley argued a total of five sit-in cases before the Court, prevailing in each of them,
despite having to argue two on one day in
the fall of 196281 and two on another day in
the fall of 1963.82 Back-to-back argumentation was nothing new for Motley, who once argued four appeals on the same day in the Fifth
Circuit. 83
During Motley's argument in Hamilton
v. Alabama,84 establishing the right to counsel at arraignment in capital cases, Motley
observed, "[Justice] Douglas seemed to pay
no attention. He appeared to be writing letters and doing other work, as usual." "Apparently [he] was paying attention," she later recognized, because he wrote the opinion for a
unanimous Court reversing Hamilton's conviction. Indeed, Douglas "place[d] [Motley]
in the top ten of any group of advocates at
the appellate level in this country,"85 comparing her to Charles Hamilton Houston, "the
highest compliment I have ever received," said
86
Motley.
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People lawyer Constance Baker Motley was photographed in 1962 when she and her colleague Jack Greenberg (right) represented James Meredith (center) in his segregation case against the University of Mississippi. Motley worked with Thurgood Marshall
on Brown v Board of Education and other landmark litigation that desegregated schools and Southern
universities.

When President Johnson invited Motley
to the White House to announce his intention
of naming her to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York in 1966, thus
making her the first African American woman
nominated for a federal judgeship, Johnson
told Motley that Attorney General Ramsey
Clark "was the first person to bring [Motley]
to his attention," doing so on the strength of
87
her Supreme Court arguments.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1933-present). It goes
almost without saying that Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg briefed and argued the leading
women's rights cases of the 1970s as cofounding director of the ACLU's Women's
Rights Project. 88 The rulings that resulted
from the Project's litigation campaign represented no less than a revolution in women's le-

gal status, overturning a century of Supreme
Court precedent that had tolerated-indeed,
embraced-differential treatment of women
and men.8 9
When the Project was formed in 1972,90
Ginsburg had just recently joined Columbia
Law School as its first tenured female faculty member and had worked out an arrangement whereby she could devote half her time
to the Project. In many ways, Ginsburg and
the Project followed the step-by-step approach
modeled by Marshall, Motley, and the NAACP
LDF in their pathbreaking litigation for racial
justice. The Project's litigation agenda was
grounded in formal equality principles, maintaining that similarly situated men and women
should be treated the same under the law. This
may seem an unsurprising principle now, but
it was by no means widely accepted at that
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time. In looking back on this period, Ginsburg
has observed, "In one sense, our mission in
the 1970s was easy: the targets were well defined. There was nothing subtle about the way
things were. Statute books in the States and
Nation were riddled with what we then called
sex-based differentials." 91
While Ginsburg defined the mission as
"easy" in one sense, one of the biggest challenges she and the Project faced was how to
persuade the Court that sex-based differentials,
long viewed as benign and even beneficial to
women, were instead deeply harmful-to men
as well as women. Ginsburg later noted:
Our mission was to educate ...
decisionmakers in the nation's legislatures and courts. We tried to convey
to them that something was wrong
with their perception of the world.
We sought to spark judges' and lawmakers' understanding that their own
daughters and granddaughters could
be disadvantaged by the way things
were. 92
In furtherance of its equality goals, the
Project participated as party representative or
friend ofthe Court in a number of cases demonstrating the ill effects of sex stereotyping on
men as well as women, as in the case of
Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld. 93 There, the Project
represented Stephen Wiesenfeld in his efforts
to obtain surviving spouse benefits to care
for his infant son, where his wife had died
in childbirth and the governing Social Security Act provision extended benefits only to
surviving wives, on the compound assumption
that mothers-and not fathers-were involved
in the daily care of their children and that
fathers-and not mothers-were their families' breadwinners. 94 The Court adopted the
Project's argument that such distinctions violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and struck down the provision.
Between 1971 and 1979, Ginsburg filed
merits briefs on behalf of parties in a total of
nine cases, arguing six. 96 In nearly all of the
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cases, Melvin Wulf, the ACLU's legal director, joined Ginsburg on the brief. Also joining
them on the briefs were a number of women
attorneys with the Project, including Brenda
Feigen Fasteau, Kathleen Peratis, and Susan
Deller Ross. 97 In addition to its party representation, the Project submitted amicus briefs
in fifteen other cases raising sex discrimination questions before the Court.98 Ginsberg did
all this while pressing for legislative reform,9 9
engaging in public education on the issues,100
teaching law at Columbia, co-authoring one
of the first casebooks on sex discrimination
law, 101 and raising two children. Reflecting
on this period, Ginsburg exclaimed, "It was
wonderful, it was really exhilarating ... but we
were always tired." 1 02
The impact of the Project's litigation campaign cannot be overstated. In the words of former Boalt Hall Dean Herma Hill Kay:
Quite literally, it was [Ginsburg's]
voice, raised in oral argument and reflected in the drafting of briefs, that
shattered old stereotypes and opened
new opportunities for both sexes. She
built, and persuaded the Court to
adopt, a new constitutional framework for analyzing the achievement
of equality for women and men. In doing so, Ginsburg in large part created
the intellectual foundations of the
103
present law of sex discrimination.
Following the Project's overwhelming success,
there was a significant rise in amicus participation in the Court by other women's rights advocacy groups, including the National Organization for Women, the Women's Legal Defense
Fund, and the National Women's Law Center.
Harriet Sturtevant
Shapiro. (1928-present)1 0' The history of women's first 100
years as Supreme Court advocates would not
be complete without highlighting the career of
the first woman member of the Solicitor General's Office, Harriet Shapiro, who was hired
by then-Solicitor General Erwin Griswold

ss8
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"It was really exhilarating... but we were always tired," recalled Justice Ginsburg (center) about her time
litigating at the Women's Rights Project in the 1970s. Her son James and nephew David (below with Ginsburg,
left to right) attended her 1979 argument in Duren v. Missouri challenging a law that allowed women-but
not men-to opt out of jury service to attend to their home and family.

in 1972. Over the course of the next twentynine years with the Solicitor General's
Office,10 Shapiro briefed seventy-two cases
and argued seventeen, 106 a record passed only
recently by Beth Brinkmann, who argued
nineteen cases for the Office between 1994
and 2001.107
Shapiro was not, however, the first woman
from the Solicitor General's Office to argue
before the Court. That distinction belongs to
Jewel LaFontant,108 a political appointee, who
preceded Shapiro in presenting argument in the
Court's 1972 Term.
I began this article by addressing the problem of the hat for early women lawyers, and
I would like to conclude by highlighting the
problem of the morning coat for women in the
Solicitor General's Office. The charcoal-gray
morning coat has been, and continues to be,
the standard uniform worn by male members
of the Solicitor General's Office when appearing before the Court. 109 What were women in
the Solicitor General's Office to do with this

uniform? Some custom-designed skirt suits resembling morning coats, while others opted for
other somber-colored suits. The retention of
the morning-coat tradition marks women advocates as different from the norm, as "nonuniform," as had the hat of an earlier era.

VI. Why Does It Matter That Women
Have Served-and Continue to
Serve-as Supreme Court Advocates?
In considering the question of "why it matters" that women have served as advocates before the Court, I have developed a number of
hypotheses, which are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive of potential explanations
for the significance of women's participation
in the Court.

1. Equality/nondiscrimination
This hypothesis suggests that women's participation as Supreme Court advocates is

WOMEN AS SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES, 1879-1979
important, regardless of its impact on case outcomes, because we as a society value equality
of opportunity and freedom from discrimination in gaining access to professional experiences of this nature.
2. Legitimacy/representativeness
This hypothesis posits that having women participate in the Supreme Court process promotes public trust and confidence that justice
will be served. Women's participation furthers
the perceived legitimacy ofthe judicial process
as a more inclusive and representative system.
3. Insider/outsider
Borrowing from the political-science literature, this hypothesis asserts that it is important
to have "insiders" operating within the system
who can advocate "outsider" perspectives for
those who do not otherwise have access to or
influence over decisionmakers. This hypothesis applies with particular force to advocacy
before the Supreme Court, where some repeat
players take on the mantle of "insiders," gaining credibility in front of and trust from the
Justices, which they can then use to benefit
"outsiders"-who have historically included
women.
4. Educational/inspirational
This hypothesis recognizes that women's participation at the highest levels of the profession is important for shattering stereotypes and modeling possibilities of women's
achievements in the law for present and future
generations.
5. Difference
This hypothesis anticipates that different styles
of argumentation, ideology, and/or outcomes
can be associated with women's Supreme
Court advocacy. Whether premised on biology, biography, or both, there is less evidence
of women modeling a different style of advocacy and more of women bringing a different set of issues to the table, changing the
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agenda and thereby changing the shape of the
law through their participation. In this regard,
there has been a notable increase in the number of cases brought before the Court raising
concerns of particular interest to women as the
number ofwomen advocates has grown. I think
here of cases related to employment discrimination, violence against women, sexual harassment, family-leave rights, affirmative action,
and gay rights, to name but a few.

In the end, arguing before the Supreme
Court connotes being the ultimate lawyer,
the ultimate gentleman, and even the ultimate warrior, given that military references are
not infrequent in the Supreme Court practice
literature.1 10 The importance of advocacy in
this forum for making a mark on history cannot be overestimated, where the greats have
shaped the law, as well as the public's and the
profession's understanding of what it means to
be a lawyer. In a profession inextricably linked
in the public's mind with authority, the exercise
of that authority by women at the highest level
is a powerfully symbolic act.
And in those cases in which women have
presented argument on issues ofparticular concern to women, the effect of women's participation is that much more profound. No longer
must women ask men to plead their interests.
Instead, they are empowered to state their own
cases, and in so doing, further empower themselves.
*Special thanks to Dean Claudio Grossman for
supporting the research that enabled this talk,
and to my assistants, Erin Shute, Amy Jiron,
Christina Vitale, and Emily Gallas, for their
wonderful work.

ENDNOTES
'An earlier article examined the experiences of the first
twenty women members of the Supreme Court bar, who
joined between 1879-the year the Court's rules were
changed to provide for women's admission-and 1900.
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Supreme Court Attorney Rolls, Vol. 4 [1884 Term-1897

Drachman, "My 'Partner' in Law and Life: Marriage in

Term] [on file with the National Archives]).

the Lives of Women Lawyers in Late

3

19 th- and

Early 2 0 th-

Clare Cushman, "Women Advocates Before the Supreme

Century America," 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 221, 228-30
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Summary ofEvents, 11 Am. L. Rev. 1876-1877, at 367
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Archives. Emphasis in original.
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Practice in the U.S.

Courts," Chi. Legal News 169

(Feb. 10, 1877) (reporting introduction in House of
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Some law schools admitted women from the time of their
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founding-for example, Howard Law School (in 1869)
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same terms as men to practise [sic] in all the Federal
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York University Law School, in 1890. Nevertheless, most

courts.").
5
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Women," 20 Stat. 292 (1879)
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woman who shall have been a member of the bar of the
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16J. Clay Smith, Jr., Emancipation: The Making of the

(1937), involved female counsel in the Supreme Court,
though Josephine Goldmark assisted Felix Frankfurter
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17Clark, supra note 1, at 92.
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in Muller v Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Goesaert v

work was Ellen Spencer Mussey, founding Dean of the
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Washington College of Law, the first law school estab-
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lished by women and for women, in 1896. Dean Mussey

women bartenders in the case. 335 U.S. 464, 465-66
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30Beverly Blair Cook, "Annette Abbott Adams," in
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years of the law school's operation. "Women Admitted to
Practice in the Supreme Court of the United States," on file
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admitted to practice before the Supreme Court by 1920 and

Notable American Women (1989) at 3.
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Feminism (Yale Univ. Press 1987) at 13.
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25131 U.S. app. clxxxvii.
26The Court in In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), de-
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assistant attorney general, Mabel Walker Willebrandt, was
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of the State of New York, 265 U.S. 545 (1924). Another
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Federal Radio Commission to defend its allocation of fre-
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U.S. 28 (1961); what it meant to be "engaged in com-
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solo practitioner in New Haven, who worked with Yale

ting trespass because he had counseled the students before

Law Professor Thomas I. Emerson on Griswold v Con-
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("Neither Kenyon nor Murray had actually participated

petitioners" had done anything other than ask for service.

in the writing of the brief, but Ginsburg was determined

Motley, supra note 77, at 198-200. The third sit-in case

to acknowledge the intellectual debt which contemporary

Motley argued in 1964 was Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S.

feminist legal argument owed to 'those brave women.' The

306 (1964).
83
Washington, supra note 77, at 139.
84368 U.S. 52 (1961).

succession of names on the Reed brief was the sign of a
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torch passed by one generation and aggressively claimed
by another.").

Douglas, supra note 64, at 185.

Thus, while Murray was not herself a Supreme Court
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Motley, supranote 77, at 194.
87
See Motley, supranote 77, at 213.

advocate, she played a critical role in the history of

88The other co-founding director was Brenda Feigen

Mayeri, "Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the

Fasteau, a 1969 graduate of Harvard Law School. See

Historical Dynamics of Change," 92 Calif L. Rev 755

women's Supreme Court advocacy. See, e.g, Serena

Karen O'Connor, Women's Organizations' Use of the

(2004) (highlighting Murray's pragmatic approach to ad-

Courts (Lexington Books 1980) at 127.
Other notable women advocates active in the Supreme

vocating expansion of women's legal status).
90
A host of individuals have provided helpful accounts

Court at this time included: Eleanor Holmes Norton, who

of the formation of the Women's Rights Project, includ-

was Mel Wulfs second-in-command at the American Civil

ing: Cowan, "Women's Rights Through Litigation," 8

Liberties Union (ACLU) in the 1960s; Kathleen Per-

Colum. HumanRightsL. Rev 373; Cushman, ed., Supreme

atis, who succeeded Justice Ginsburg as director of the

Court Decisions and Women's Rights, supra note 50;

Women's Rights Project, Project attorney Susan Deller

Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 137-38 (2d

Ross; Jane Picker of the Women's Law Fund in Cleveland;

ed. 1993); Herma Hill Kay, "Celebration of the Tenth

Harriet Rabb of the New York City Corporation Coun-

Anniversary of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Appoint-

sel's Office (and NYCLU board member, who left to start

ment to the Supreme Court of the United States: Ruth

an employment discrimination clinic at Columbia Law
School in 1971); Sarah Weddington of Texas; and Wendy

Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law," 104 Colum. L. Rev 1,
12 (2004) (hereafter "Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of

Williams of the California-based Equal Rights Advocates.

Law"); Kerber, supra note 58, at 199-204 (see also Linda
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Before

addressing

the Women's

Rights

Project's

K. Kerber, "Sally Reed demands Equal Treatment," in

litigation directly, the author would like to recognize the

Days of Destiny 440 [James McPherson & Alan Brinkley,
eds. 2001]); O'Connor, Womens Organizations' Use of

influence of Pauli Murray, an African-American lawyer,
political scientist, and Episcopalian minister, whose writings on the parallels between race and sex discrimination

the Courts, supra note 90, at 123-30; Wendy Williams,
"Sex Discrimination: Closing the Law's Gender Gap," in

shaped the thinking of a generation of students and schol-

The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme

ars, including Justice Ginsburg. See, e.g, Pauli Murray

Court, 1969-86 109 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987); and,

and Mary 0. Eastwood, "Jane Crow and the Law: Sex

of course, Justice Ginsburg herself. See, e.g., Ruth Bader

Discrimination and Title VII," 34 George Wash. L. Rev

Ginsburg, "Comment on Reed v Reed," Women s Rights

232 (1965). Murray's influence also came through her

Law Reporter 7 (1977); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Com-

service on the ACLU Board, where, in the late 1960s,

ment: Frontiero v Richardson," Women s Rights Law

WOMEN AS SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES, 1879-1979
Reporter 2 (1973); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Gender and

Calfano v Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); and

the Constitution," 44 U Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Ruth Bader

Duren v Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).

Ginsburg, "Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and
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1974 Terms," 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
"Sex Equality and the Constitution," 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451

Women's Rights Project in the following cases:
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Justice Ginsburg presented argument on behalf of the

(1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Sexual Equality Under the

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);

Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments," 1979 Wash.

Kahn v Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974);

U L. Q. 161 (1979); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Remarks for

Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld,420 U.S. 636(1975);

the Celebration of 75 Years of Women's Enrollment at

Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975);

Columbia Law School," 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1441 (2002)

Calfano v Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); and

(hereafter "Remarks for the Celebration").

Duren v Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).

91

Ginsburg, "Remarks for the Celebration," supranote 92,
at 1441.
92Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Foreword to Symposium:
Women, Justice and Authority," 14 Yale IL. & Fem. 213,
214-15 (2002) (hereafter "Foreword to Symposium"). As
Justice Brennan characterized it in his opinion in Frontiero
v. Richardson, "Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism,' which,
in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in

97

See, e.g., Fasteau in Frontiero,411 U.S. at 677 (Fasteau's

then husband, Marc Fasteau, also contributed importantly
to the Project's brief in Frontiero),and Ross in Los Angeles
Dept. ofWater andPowerv Manhart,435 U.S. 702 (1978),
and Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia,430 U.S.
703 (1977).
98The Women's Rights Project filed amicus briefs in the
following cases:

a cage." 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). This pedestal/cage

PittsburghPress Co. v. PittsburghCommission

metaphor was first used by California Supreme Court Jus-

on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973);

tice Peters in the Sail'erInn case. Sail'erInn, Inc. v. Kirby,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341 (Cal. 1971).
93
1n Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)

ClevelandBoard ofEducation v La Fleur, 414

(Ginsburg briefed and argued as counsel for plaintiff ap-

(1974);

U.S. 632 (1972);
CorningGlass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188

peltee Wiesenfeld), the Court struck down certain sex-

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974);

based distinctions in the Social Security Act that provided

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v Wetzel, judg-

survivor benefits to wives and children in the case of working husbands' deaths, but only to the children-and not

ment vacatedfor want ofan appealableorder,
424 U.S. 737 (1976);

to the husband-in the case of a working wife's death.

General Electric Co. v Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125

This, the Court held, violated the Fifth Amendment's Due

(1976);

Process Clause because it discriminated against female

Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);

wage-earners by providing them less protection for their

Coker v Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977);

survivors than male wage-earners received and perpetu-

Dothardv Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);

ated an archaic and overbroad generalization that women's

Nashville Gas Co. v Satty, 434 U.S. 136

wages were not as vital to their families' support as were

(1977);

men's wages.
94The Project followed a similar strategy in Craig v Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), where the Project filed an amicus

265 (1978);
Los Angeles Dep't of Water andPower v Man-

brief challenging the constitutionality of a state law that

hart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978);

set a higher minimum drinking age for men than women

Orr v Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);

for 3.2 beer.
95The Women's Rights Project filed briefs on the merits

Calfano v Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); and

in the following cases:

142 (1980).

Univ. of CalforniaRegents v Bakke, 438 U.S.

Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.

Reed v Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);

99

Struck v Secretary of Defense, cert. granted,
409 U.S. 947,judgment vacated, 409 U.S. 1071

1old.

(1972);

Hill Kay, Text, Cases, and Materials on Sex-Based Dis-

Frontierov Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);

crimination (1974).
02
1 Kerber, supranote 58, at 204. Three of the most signif-

Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974);

1

Ginsburg, "Remarks for the Celebration," at 1446.

01

Kenneth Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Herma

Weinbergerv Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);

icant cases on which Ginsburg worked during her time at

Edwards v Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975);

the Project:

Turner v Dep't ofEmployment Security, 423
U.S. 44 (1975);

1. Reed v Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Ginsburg briefed).
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Ginsburg filed a brief for appellant in Reed v. Reed

Brief for Appellant in Reed at 6. Noting that the Court

in the summer of 1971 as a volunteer lawyer with the

itself was implicit in this discrimination, Ginsburg un-

ACLU, before the Women's Rights Project was formed.

derscored how far social norms had changed:

Reed had been spotted by ACLU General Counsel Marvin Karpatkin. See Epstein, supra note 92, at 137.

Prior decisions of this Court have contributed

In Reed, a mother and father, by then divorced, each

to the separate and unequal status of women in

petitioned to be named estate administrator for their

the United States.. .. [But] .. . [i]n very recent

seventeen-year-old son, who had died of self-inflicted

years, anew appreciation of women's place has

gunshot wounds while on a custodial visit with his fa-

been generated in the United States. Activated

ther. The probate court judge appointed the father as

by feminists of both sexes, courts and legis-

administrator despite the fact that the mother's appli-

latures have begun to recognize the claim of

cation had been filed first in time because Idaho law

women to fIll membership in the class "per-

provided that, "as between persons equally entitled to

sons" entitled to due process guarantees of life

administer a decedent's estate [such as a mother and fa-

and liberty and the equal protection of the laws.

ther], 'males must be preferred to females."' Ginsburg,
"Remarks for the Celebration," at 1444 (quoting Idaho
Code§ 15-314).
Ginsburg framed the issue for decision in Reed as
whether the sex-based distinction contained in the Idaho
code "created a 'suspect classification' requiring close
judicial scrutiny." Brief for Appellant in Reed at 5. As
such, Ginsburg invited use of the strict-scrutiny standard of review, hitherto applied only to cases of fundamental rights, such as voting, and to classifications
based on race and national origin. Strict scrutiny requires the government, in defending its law, to articulate a compelling justification and demonstrate that
the chosen means were narrowly tailored to serve the
governmental purpose.

Brief for Appellant in Reed at 5-6, 10.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, the Court struck down the Idaho
law as violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. This was the first time in history that
the Court struck down a law on the grounds of sex
discrimination.
2. Frontierov Richardson,411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Ginsburg
briefed and argued as amicus, where local counsel-Joe
Levin, Morris Dees's partner at the Southern Poverty
Law Center-had agreed to allow Ginsburg to direct
the litigation in the Supreme Court, but later expressed
concern at Ginsburg's emphasis on heightened-scrutiny
rather than rational-basis review in the merits brief).
The complainants in Frontiero were Sharron Fron-

Ginsburg analogized sex to race:

tiero, an Air Force officer, and her then husband, Joseph

[I]t is presumptively impermissible to distin-

Frontiero, a full-time college student. Sharron Frontiero

guish on the basis of an unalterable identifying

had been denied access to military housing and medical

trait over which the individual has no control

benefits for her husband on the same terms that male of-

and for which he or she should not be disad-

ficers had for their wives. While a male officer's spouse

vantagedby the law. Legislative discrimination

was presumed dependent upon him for support, regard-

grounded on sex, for purposes unrelated to any

less of how much she earned, Sharron Frontiero had to

biological difference between the sexes, ranks

prove that her husband relied on her earnings for more

with legislative discrimination based on race,
another congenital, unalterable trait of birth,
and merits no greater judicial deference.

than one-half of his support in order to gain dependent
spouse benefits for him.
Eight Justices voted to strike down the sex-based
classification in Frontiero as unconstitutional. In writ-

Brief for Appellant in Reed, at 5. Ginsburg appended to
her Reed brief a compilation of sex-based differentials
then currently reflected in state and federal law. According to Ginsburg, "Research for the brief and appendix

ing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Brennan
specifically cited the data Ginsburg set forth in her brief
on women's underrepresentation in politics as underscoring the need for heightened scrutiny of sex-based
classifications:

was supplied by law students from NYU, Rutgers, and
Yale." Ginsburg, "Foreword to Symposium," at 214.

[W]omen are vastly under-represented in this

Relying on this compendium, Ginsburg argued:

Nation's decisionmaking councils. There has
never been a female President, nor a female

The distance to equal opportunity for women

member of this Court. Not a single woman

in the United States remains considerable in

presently sits in the United States Senate, and

face of the pervasive social, cultural and legal

only 14 women hold seats in the House of Rep-

roots of sex-based discrimination.

resentatives. And, as appellants point out, this
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underrepresentation is present throughout all

Amendment Due Process Clause a U.S. Navy regula-

levels of our State and Federal Government.

tion that allowed up to thirteen years of commissioned

411 U.S. at 686 n. 17 (citing Joint Reply Brief of Ap-

service to women before being mandatorily discharged

pellants and American Civil Liberties Union [amicus

for failure to obtain promotion, while requiring men's

curiae]at 9). Brennan proceeded to apply strict scrutiny

mandatory discharge upon being twice passed over for

to the military benefit program's sex-based classifica-

promotion, even when fewer than thirteen years had
elapsed;

tion, reasoning that sex-based classifications, like those
based on race, were inherently suspect because sex, like

* Calfano v Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (Shapiro briefed
and argued on behalf of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare as a party; joining Shapiro

race, was an immutable characteristic.
3. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Ginsburg briefed

on brief were two women-Assistant Attorney Gen-

as amicus).
Craigwas most important for resolving years of un-

eral Barbara Babcock and Justice Department attorney

certainty as to the level of scrutiny with which sex-based
classifications would be reviewed. There, the Court ar-

Susan Ehrlich-and a number of male colleagues),
holding not violative of the Fifth Amendment Due

ticulated a new intermediate scrutiny standard, located

Process Clause a provision of the Social Security Act

between the traditional rational basis review and the

that limited mothers' insurance benefits to widows

strict scrutiny accorded fundamental rights and race-

and divorced wives of male wage-earners, thereby ex-

based classifications. Applying this standardto the facts

cluding mothers of children born outside of marriage;
and

at issue in Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma
law setting a different legal age for purchasing 3.2
beer for women and men-18 for women, and 21 for

* Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v EEOC,
462 U.S. 669 (1983) (Shapiro briefed and argued on
behalf of The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-

men.
3
10 Kay, "Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law," at 20.

mission as a party), holding violative of the Pregnancy

1040ffice of the Solicitor General, "In re Harriet S.

Discrimination Act a limitation in a company's health-

Shapiro, Esq.: Petition for a Writ of Appreciation (2000)"

insurance coverage of pregnancy-related costs for male

at 2.
5
10 Shapiro's work with the Solicitor General's Office was

employees' spouses.
107Beth S. Brinkmann, "First Arguments at the Supreme

divided into roughly three periods. Her first decade was

Court of the United States: A First Argument in the

spent drafting briefs and arguing cases. Her second was

Tradition of Many," 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 61

engaged with drafting briefs, rather than arguing. In her

(2003).

last decade, she assumed a variety of other tasks, includ-

'osLaFontant had been promoted to the rank of deputy

ing screening cert petitions in criminal cases and responding to Freedom of Information Act requests. See "Petition

solicitor general by 1975. See, e.g., Schlesingerv Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975).

for a Writ of Appreciation for Harriet Shapiro," bestowed

10 Supreme Court A to Z, supra note 3, at 427.

upon Shapiro on the occasion of her retirement from the

110See, e.g., Kenneth Mack, "A Social History of Every-

Solicitor General's Office in 2001. The author thanks Beth

day Practice: Sadie T. M. Alexander and the Incorporation

Brinkmann for bringing this petition to her attention.
6
10 Shapiro's seventeen argued cases included:

of Black Women into the Legal Profession, 1925-1960,"

9

87 Cornell L. Rev 1405, 1414-15 (2002). ("Until women
were admitted to the profession, courtrooms were battle-

* Schlesinger v Ballard,419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Shapiro argued, but did not brief), holding not violative of the Fifth

fields where men engaged in forensic warfare in front of
all-male juries and judiciaries").

